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TheInpact of Deregulation on the &tployirent
and Wages of Airline Mechanics
ABST}ACT
Thispaper describes the effects of deregulation on negotiated wage
rates and employment levels of aircraft mechanics in the scheduled
airline industry. Firm—specific data for the incumbent trunk airlines
show relatively small changes in real wage rates since deregulation,
and only recent increases in interfirm wage differentials. Employment
growth rates, on the other hand, have varied widely among the incum-
bents, and between the incumbent trunks and the local service and new—
entrant airlines. The data suggest that deregulation resulted in a
transfer of 5000—7000 maintenance jobs from the incumbent trunks to the
smaller airlines. This shift in employment reduced mechanics' earnings






The recent experience of the airline industry provides a
remarkable case study for the analysis of wage and employment outcomes
under trade unions. Since passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in
1978, the industry has witnessed steady erosion in the relative output
of the incumbent trunk airlines, and steady increases in the relative
importance of new entrants and former local service carriers. These
changes have been associated with substantial reductions in employment
at the trunks, and widely publicized contract renegotiations, often
involving wage concessions or two-tiered wage schedules.
This paper describes the impact of deregulation on the wage rates
and employment of airline mechanics at the former trunk airlines between
1978 and 1984.-" The analysis is necessarily preliminary since many of
the effects of deregulation are ongoing, and mechanics wages are estab-
lished in long term contracts that adjust slowly to external shocks.
Nevertheless, the experience of airline mechanics in the first six years
of deregulation yields a number of insights into the response of trade
unions to an increase in product market competition.
Among the three major groups of skilled employees in the airline
industry (pilots, flight attendants, mechanics) airline mechanics are
atypical. First, their training and skills are relatively easily trans-
ferred out of the airline industry. Second, the services of mechanics
are relatively easily replaced: many airlines purchase all or part of
their maintenance services from outside contractors. Third. employment
conditions for many mechanics resemble those of industrial workers:
roughly one—half of airline mechanics work at maintenance depots on con-
ventional work schedules. For these reasons, however, airline mechanics—2—
are most similar to unionized workers elsewhere in the economy.It is
natural, therefore, to look to the experiences of the mechanics in
attempting to draw general conclusions from the deregulatory experience
of the airline industry.
II. Wages and Employment of Airline Mechanics
The data for this study consist of annual observations on employ—
ment, wages, and output at eleven of the largest airline firms in the
U.S.: American, Braniff, Continental. Delta, Eastern, Northwest, PanAm,
Transworld, United, USAir, and Western. Mechanics at seven of these
airlines are represented by the Machinists union (lAM). Mechanics at
American and PanAm are represented by the Transport Workers Union (TWU).
while mechanics at Western are represented by the Teamsters (IBT), and
mechanics at Delta are unorganized. The Machinists and Teamsters also
represent mechanics at several smaller airlines and contract maintenance
firms
a. Wages
Table 1 presents a wage chronology for ten incumbent trunk airlines
over the period 1968 to l985.' The table contains wage rates for cer-
tified mechanics at the signing date of each new contract. For compara--
tive purposes, the table also presents contract wage rates for certified
aircraft mechanics at Boeing, and average wage rates of maintenance
mechanics and production workers in manufacturing industries.
A striking feature of the table is the uniformity across airlines
in mechanics' wage rates. This uniformity persisted through two rounds
of contract negotiations after 1978:the 1978-79 round (in row 6 of-3—
Table 1), and the 1982—83 round (in row 7 of the Table). Very recently,
wage differentials have opened up in the industry, with significantly
lower wage rates at several of the financially—troubled airlines. Wage
rates at the financially-sound airlines have maintained the pattern of
equality established in the industry prior to deregulation.1
Several explanations have been offered for the long delay between
passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 and the breakdown of
pattern wage bargaining for airline mechanics. On one hand, entry of
the new carriers and expansion of the former local-service airlines
occurred slowly after 1978. On the other hand, product market com-
petition and downward pressure on labor costs reached an unprecedented
level during the 1982 recession, when two of the incumbent trunks
(Braniff and Continental) underwent bankruptcy and all the trunks
incurred large operating losses.' Some observers have interpreted the
recent movement away from a uniform industry wage as a permanent struc-
tural change engendered by deregulation. Others have argued that
airline—specific wage concessions reflect the interaction of economic
conditions and a newly competitive product market structure, and that
improving economic conditions will renew pressure for uniform wages
among the carriers. At this stage, however, it is unclear whether wage
dispersion will persist, or whether the industry will return to a more
uniform wage structure.
Further evidence on the distribution of wage rates within the sche-
duled airline industry is presented in Table 2.This table presents
wage data for airline mechanics from BLS industry wage surveys conducted—4—
in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1984. Average wage rates in the industry are
closely linked to the contract rates reported in Table 1. There is a
downward shift in the industry average wage rate relative to the
contractual rate at United Airlines after 1975. Wage dispersion within
the industry also increased in the most recent survey. The coefficient
of variation of wage rates, presented in the last column of Table 2,
doubled between 1980 and 1984. The 1984 wage distribution shows a small
concentration of wage rates some 20—40 percent below the industry mean
wage, whereas the earlier distributions are unimodal and highly con—
cent rated.
Tables 1 and 2 also present evidence on time—series variability of
real and relative wage rates of airline mechanics. Outside of the
air transport industry ,theaircraft and parts industry is a major
employer of aircraft mechanics. The wage chronology for mechanics at
Boeing suggests that wage rates have been very similar in the two indus-
tries. Relative wage rates between the aircraft assembly and scheduled
airline industries did not change between 1978 and 1983. The same con-
clusion emerges from a comparison of mechanics' wage rates and average
wage rates of maintenance mechanics or production workers in manufac-
turing. Relative to either rate, airline mechanics' wages have been
more or less constant since the 1969 round of contract negotiations.
Relative to the Consumer Price Index, airline mechanics' average wage
rates have been approximately constant since 1975.
The similarity between contract provisions at the major airlines
extends to most aspects of compensation, including pensions, vacations,—5—
and health plans. In addition, the major airlines that have not nego-
tiated wage concessions since 1982 (American, Northwest, United, USAir)
have all introduced two—tiered wage schedules.VTwo—tiered schedules
have also recently spread among the smaller unionized carriers in the
The pattern of the wage data in Table 1 contrasts sharply
with the pattern of the firm—specific employment data in Table 3.
While wages remained relatively constant across firms from 1966 to 1983,
employment growth varied substantially. Between 1970 and 1978, for
example, mechanics' employment fell about 10 percent at American,
Continental, and Transworld. while employment fell about 20 percent
at United. During the same period, employment grew or remained approxi-
mately constant at the other airlines. In spite of this variation
across firms in employment demand, airline mechanics were remarkably
successful in maintaining a homogeneous wage structure. There is no
indication that mechanics historically adjusted contractual wage rates in
response to firm—specific factors.
The implication of this homogeneous industry wage structure is that
a firm—by—firm analysis of wage determination for airline mechanics is
likely to be misleading. Several authors have recently estimated models
in which unions determine wages at the firm level subject to the con-
straint imposed by the firms labor demand funct.ion.-0" While such a
model may turn out to be useful in describing post-1983 wage develop-
ments in the industry, it gives few insights into the homogeneous wage
structure that prevailed in the industry before 1983.-6—
b. Employment
Table 3 summarizes employment levels and growth rates between 1970
and 1984 at 11 major airlines and in the industry as a whole. In
1970, the trunk airlines accounted for 93 percent of total industry
employment. Between 1970 and 1978, maintenance employment at the trunks
fell by about 12 percent. During the same period employment at the
local service airlines increased by 70 percent, causing the share of
employment at the trunks to fall to 87 percent in 1978. This trend per—
sisted after 1978, with some increase in the relative growth rate of
maintenance employment at the non-trunk airlines. In 1984, the incum--
bent trunks' share of industry employment was 80 percent.
To place these trends in perspective, Table 4 provides an overview
of flight activity in the industry. The relative pattern of growth
rates in employment and output is similar, although industry output grew
during the last decade while employment fell. Consequently, measured
output per maintenance employee has increased. Much of this increase in
output per worker, particularly at the smaller airlines, is attributable
to changes in type of aircraft and route flown. Since 1978. the non—
trunk airlines have increased the length of their routes and size of
their aircraft, and in many cases have switched from turboprop to jet-
engine aircraft. These changes have been associated with rapid
increases in ton—miles and seat--miles per departure and per emp1oyee."
Although output and employment shares of the incumbent trunks have
both declined sharply since 1970, the drop in output share occurred
after 1978 while the drop in employment share started earlier.In 1984,—7.-
the trunks' employment share exceeded their output share by 6 percent.
In part this may reflect the contracting—out of maintenance services by
the smaller airlines—-often to the trunks themselves.- On balance,
however, the output and employment data suggest that most of the rela-
tive decline in maintenance employment at the trunks is attributable to
the decline in their relative output. This hypothesis is tested in the
next section using data from four major trunk airlines: American,
Eastern, Transworld, and United.
III. Changes in Productivity of Maintenance Employees
Between 1978 and 1984, the combined output of the four largest
incumbent trunk airlines (American, Eastern, Transworld, and United)
increased by 14 percent. During the same period, their combined mainte-
nance employment fell 10 percent. Although some of this improved pro-
ductivity represents a longer—term trend, it is interesting to ask
whether deregulation contributed to the rate of' growth of maintenance
productivity at the incumbent airlines, Several recent changes asso-
ciated with deregulation may have lead to an increase in trend produc-
tivity growth after 1978. These include the shift toward hub-based
routing systems, which permit more centralized line service maintenance.
and negotiated changes in work rules and staffing requirements.
In order to investigate the rate of growth of maintenance produc-
tivity, I fit a variety of employment functions for mechanics at the
four major trunks.— These functions express current maintenance
employment in terms of airline—specific constants and trends, as well as
lagged employment and current flight activity. The inclusion of lagged-8—
employment captures the idea that employment adjusts slowly to output
fluctuations. Flight activity is modelled in two alternative ways.In
the first case. I represent airline output by departures, and control
for the composition of aircraft and routes by including measures of
seats per aircraft and flight length. In the second case, I control
for aircraft and route composition by including a measure of ton—miles
per departure. The latter specification permits maintenance employment
to depend on arbitrary combinations of output as measured by departures
or available ton—miles.
A preliminary investigation revealed no systematic wage effects on
employment levels at the four airlines. In view of the stability of
real wage rates over time, however, and in the absence of data on prices
of substitutes for mechanics' services, it is not surprising that the
estimated wage effects are small and imprecise.I therefore concentrate
on the link between employment and output, and changes in output per
worker over time.
The estimated employment demand functions are presented in Table 5.
The employment functions are fitted as a four—equation seemingly—
unrelated regression, with equaUty restrictions on the coefficients of
lagged employment and output. Test results presented in row 7 of
Table 5 indicate substantial conformity with the hypothesis of constant
returns to scale in maintenance activities, after controlling for
partial—adjustment.--" This restriction is therefore imposed on the
estimated employment functions in Table 5.
The first two columns of the table present employment functions-9—
with no allowance for changes in productivity growth after 1978. The
overall fit of the employment function is similar for the two speci-
fications, and there is no strong basis to choose between them. The
estimated coefficients suggest that a 10 percent increase in output
brings about a 6—7 percent increase in employment within the year, and
a proportional change in employment within three years.
The implied decompositions of employment changes between 1978 and
1984 are presented in Table 6.For each airline, two decompositions are
presented, depending on the choice of output specification. The decom-
positions show a declining demand for maintenance employment at all four
airlines attributable to secular productivity growth. The productivity
component is relatively large at United Airlines, and is roughly similar
between the two specifications for all the airlines except Transworld.
Productivity effect are partially offset by increases in the size of
aircraft and length of flight, or alternatively by increases in ton—
miles per departure. Changes in employment attributable to changes in
output are large and negative at Transworld and United, and relatively
small at American and Eastern.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 present employment functions that
permit airline—specific shifts in the rate of growth of maintenance pro-
ductivity after 1978. The trend shifts are imprecisely measured, and
the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero is easily accepted at
conventional significance 1evels.—' The estimates differ somewhat
between the two specifications, although they suggest that the largest
increase in trend productivity growth occurred at United. The point-10--
estimates of the change in productivity at United imply that maintenance
employment was approximately 20 percent lower in 1984 than it would have
been in the absence of a shift in trend, although the estimated cumula-
tive effect is imprecise, and insignificantly different from zero by
conventional standards)-" Apart from the distinction between secular
and post—1978 productivity trends, the decompositions of employment
changes associated with the specifications in columns (3) and (4) are
very similar to those presented in Table 6.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 5 present employment func-
tions estimated under the hypothesis of a uniform shift in trend produc-
tivity growth at all four airlines. Again, the estimated trend shifts
are imprecise and differ somewhat depending on specification.
Controlling for flight length and aircraft size, the estimated shift in
productivity growth is .7 percent per year, implying a cumulative effect
in 1984 of about 6 percent. Controlling for ton-miles the estimated
shift is slightly larger, implying a cumulative effect of about 10 per-
cent in 1984. These estimates suggest that maintenance employment at
the four largest trunks in 1984 was 5--b percent lower than would have
been predicted on the basis of pre-deregulatory trends. Because of the
short time period since deregulation, however, it is difficult to obtain
a precise estimate of the trend change in 1978, and the data are statis-
tically consistent with no change in productivity growth rates.
The estimates in Table 5 and the decompositions in Table 6 suggest
two conclusions. First, if deregulation has caused an increase in pro-
ductivity growth rates, the effect has been relatively small. Second,—11--
the major components of employment change for the four largest trunk
airlines are declining departure activity (for Transworld and United)
and secular productivity growth. These effects have been partially off-
set by increases in aircraft size and flight length, with relatively
small net changes in employment at two of the trunks (American and
Eastern).
On the basis of these conclusions, it is possible to estimate the
effect of deregulation on maintenance employment at the incumbent trunks
by calculating their relative output losses since 1978. Between 1978
and 1984, the growth rates of departures and ton—miles for the industry
as a whole exceeded their respective rates at the trunks by 17 and 18
percent. Assuming a unitary elasticity betweenemployment and out-
put, as suggested by the estimates in Table 5, employment would have
been 15-20 percent higher at the trunks in 1984 if they had retained
their pre—deregulatory share of industry output. If, in addition,
deregulation increased the rate of growth of maintenance productivity as
suggested by the point estimates in Table 5, then employment would have
been at most 20-30 percent higher at the trunks in the absence of dere—
gulat ton
Combining these estimates with an estimate of the wage gap between
the incumbent trunks and the smaller airlines yields an estimate of the
effect of deregulation on the earnings of mechanics in the airline
industry. Evidence from industry wage surveys and union contracts at the
smaller airlines suggests that the wage gap between the incumbent trunks
and other airlines is relatively small: perhaps no more than 25 percent.—12—
This gap is consistent with the difference between new—hire rates and
established rates in two-tiered contracts recently introduced at many of
the trunks, and with the magnitude of wage concessions recently negoti-
ated at several of the trunks.It also represents the historical gap
between mechanics' wage rates at the incumbent trunks and average hourly
earnings of maintenance mechanics in manufacturing industries. Assuming
a maximum 25 percent wage differential, employment losses at the trunks
attributable to deregulation have reduced total earnings of maintenance
workers in the industry by approximately 5 percent.
Summary and Conclusions
Deregulation of the airline industry has had a strong impact on the
level of flight activity and the profitability of the incumbent trunk
airlines.'' For airline mechanics at these airlines, however, the main
effect of deregulation has been to reduce employment. While contracts
at several of the trunks cut wages at the end of 1983, mechanics' real
and relative wage rates were remarkably stable in the first five years
of deregulation. Wage stability across firms and over time is consis-
tent with the behavior of mechanics' wages prior to deregulation. Data
from 1970 to 1978 indicate that wages were historically insensitive to
firm—specific employment conditions. This pattern persisted after 1978,
with only recent evidence of a breakdown in the homogeneous industry
wage structure.
Reductions in maintenance employment at the incumbent trunks since
1978 can be attributed to several different factors including secular
productivity growth and changes in output. An analysis of the—13—
employment—output relationship reveals small but imprecisely measured
increases in the rate of growth of productivity following deregulation.
An analysis of output shares, on the other hand, reveals a 10 percentage
point drop in the share of flight activity at the incumbent trunks since
1978. This loss in output share is equivalent to a 15-20 percent reduc-
tion in maintenance employment at the incumbent trunks, or a transfer of
5000—7000 maintenance jobs from the incumbent trunks to the smaller
airlines. Because the wage gap between the incumbent trunks and the
other airlines in the industry is small, the effect of this transfer on
the earnings of mechanics in the industry is small——at most 5 percent.
In contrast to this effect for airline mechanics, the affect of de-
regulation on pilots' earnings may have been 1arger.-2" Compared to
mechanics, however, historical differentials between pilots' earnings at
the incumbent trunks were relatively large. By the same token, pilots
have relatively few employment opportunities outside the airline
industry. This raises an important hypothesis for further research: is
the effect of product market deregulation on wages or earnings related
to the historical structure of wages in the industry or the gap between
wage rates for similar workers in other industries? The experience of
the airline mechanics suggests that the impact is small when inter—firm
and inter—industry wage differentials are small. More detailed com-
parisons between pilots, flight attendants, and mechanics could provide
useful evidence on this hypothesis.—14—
Footnotes
—"There is a growing literature on the effect of deregulation on
industrial relations in the airline industry. See in particular the
papers by Hendriks, Feuilie and Szerszen (1980), Northrup (1983), and
Capelli (1985). Cordes, Goldfarb and Johnson (1984) describe the likely
effect of job loss compensation provisions of the Airline Deregulation
Act. Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1985) give an overview of deregula-
tion's effect on the industry as a whole.
"Based on 1984 employment figures for 92 percent of maintenance
workers in the industry, the JAM represents 63 percent of airline mecha-
nics, the TWU represents 22 percent of mechanics, and the IBT represents
5 percent of mechanics.
The wage data in Table 1 was assembled from a variety of sources,
including contracts on file at the National Mediation Board, and pub—
lished reports in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Wage
Developments and the Bureau of National Affair's Daily Labor Report.
am grateful to the Airline Division of the IBT for supplying me with
copies of the Western Airlines contracts from 1966 to 1981.
'The pattern ofwages in Table 1 extends to many of the smaller
unionized carriers in the industry. For example, the mechanics' wage
rate was 16.25 in September 1983 in the Ozark Airlines--Airline
Mechanics Fraternal Association contract; 15.91 in April 1983 in the
Piedmont Airlines—JAM contract; 15.59 in September 1983 in the Pacific
Southwest Airlines—IBT contract; and 15.91 in June 1983 in the—15—
Republic Airlines—lAM contract. Concessionary contracts were subse-
quently signed at Pacific Southwest and Republic, while Ozark and
Piedmont have retained wage parity with the more profitable trunk
airlines.
For theeconomy as a whole, the 1982 recession was deeper but
shorter-lived than the 1973-74 recession. In the airline industry,
sales as measured by revenue passenger miles were more or less constant
between 1973 and 1975, and between 1980 and 1982 (compared with an
average annual growth rate of revenue passenger miles of 6.4 percent per
year over the 1971—84 period). Real average passenger fares fell about
5 percent between 1974 and 1975, and about 10 percent between 1981 and
1982.
According to 1980 Census data, 52percent of aircraft mechanics
are employed in the air transportation industry, of which roughly two-
thirds are employed in the certified airline industry. Some 20 percent
of aircraft mechanics are employed in the aircraft and parts industry,
while another 20 percent are employed in the military.
The schedule at American Airlines, forexample, provides approxi-
mately 25 percent lower discounted earnings for new hires during their
first 12 years with the firm than for incumbent workers with similar
qualifications. Two-tiered schedules were introduced in the February
1983 contract at American; in the July 1984 contract at United; in the
April 1985 contract at USAIr; and in the July 1985 contract at
Northwest.
Two—tieredwage schedules were introduced in April 1982 at—16—
Piedmont; in June 1982 at Ozark; and in June 1983 at Repub].ic.
The employment data in Table 3 is taken from Schedule P—lO of the
Form 41 reports filed by the airlines with the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The figures represent fourth quarter employment in 1970 and year—end
employment in 1978 and 1984 for maintenance and related workers. A com-
parison of maintenance employment with employment of mechanics and
inspectors recorded in the industry wage surveys suggests that some
70—80 percent of maintenance employees are mechanics or inspectors.
"See for example Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) or Pencavel (1984).
example, Piedmont Airlines increased their available ton—
miles and available seat miles at a rate of approximately 28 percent per
year from 1978 to 1984. Over the same period, maintenance employment
and scheduled departures grew at only 8 percent per year. The increase
in capacity came from the replacement of turbo-prop aircraft by two—and
three—engine jet aircraft, and associated increases in seats per air-
craft (from 86 in 1978 to 126 in 1984) and flight length (from 181 miles
in 1978 to 347 miles in 1984).
'Peop1es Express, for example, employs none of its own airline
mechanics.
choice of the four major trunks is somewhat arbitrary. Most
of the other incumbent trunks were affected by mergers, forced reorgani-
zation. or prolonged strikes in the period 1970—84.
Tests for coefficient equality were insignificant at 20 percent
significance levels in all cases.
fitted employment demand functions have the form-17—
log E1t =a1bt A log E±t_i +9log F1t + + €it
where E1t represents maintenance employment at airline i in period
t, a1 and b1 are airline—specific constants and trends, Ft repre-
sents departures at airline 1in period t, x represents a control
for aircraft and routes, and €jt is an error term. The hypothesis of
a one-to-one employment-output relation is represented by 8 =1-A
16/ .. . — Theprobability values of the test statistics for no shift in
trend after 1978 are .46 and .35 respectively, for the employment func-
tions in columns (3) and (4).
a first—order autoregressive model with a coefficient of A
on the lagged dependent variable, the effect of a change in trend of 5
percent at some reference period yields a cumulative effect of
5(t +(t-l)A+(t-2)X2+..A1)t periods later. Over a six year
interval, the cumulative effect is 7.26 if A =0.2and 85 if
A =0.3.A rough estimate of the standard error for the cumulative
effect can be obtained by multiplying the standard error of the esti-
mated trend shift (6) by the appropriate cumulative factor.
--Industry scheduled departures were 50403000 in 1978 and 5616OOO
in 1984. Scheduled departuresat the 11 incumbent trunks were 3509000
in1978 and 3195000 in 1984.
example, Delta Airlines earned operating losses for the
first time in its history in 1982. Braniff, Continental, Eastern and
Western, which all earned positive operating profits from 1970 to 1978.
earned large operating losses from 1980—1983. By comparison, USAIr
earned significantly higher operating profits after 1978 than before.—18--
"According to BLS industry wage surveys administered in1975,
1980, and 1984, average gross monthly earnings of captains and the
corresponding coefficients of variation of captains' earnings were $4314
and .15 in 1975; $6877 and .19 in 1980; and $8154 and .29 in 1984. In
1967 dollars, these average earnings levels were $2676 in 1975, $2786
in 1980, and $2621 in 1984.-19-
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Maintenance Employment Functions for Four Major Airlines: 1971-84
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent
No Trend Shift

































































































test for unit output
elasticity .64 .32 .44 .97 .59 .96
8.Standard Error .050 .058 .043 .057 .046 .059
Note: Ic Regressions include unrestricted airline—specific constants, unrestricted airline—specif
trends, and dummy variables for strikes at Transworld (1973) and United (1975, 1979).
Coefficients on lagged employment, departures, and available ton-miles are restricted to be
equal across airlines. The sum of the coefficients on lagged employment and departures is
restricted to unity. The probability values of the test for this restriction are reported I
row 7.Table 6
Decomposition of Employment Changes 1978-84














1. Change in Departures .4 .2 -2.5 —4.0-33.6-35.2—10.8 -11.2
2. Change in Flight
Length 1.4 -—- 2.8--- 1.5 -—— 2.7
3 Change in Seats per
Aircraft 7.2 -—— 8.3——- 15.7 -—— 7.1
4. Change in Ton Miles
per Departure -——6.0 -—- 12.1 ——— 12.3 ——— 8.9
5. Trend Productivity —6.7 —4.3 —6.3 —4.4 —11.4 —3.5—15.0 —15.1
Total Predicted Change
in Employment 2.3 1.7 2,33.7-27.8-26.4—16.0—17.4
Actual Change in
Employment -2.3 1.4 -27.4 -18.0
Notes:
l"Predicted percentage changes based on estimated employment functions in Table 5.
For each airline, the predicted changes in column (1) correspond to the estimated
model in column (1) of' Table 5. while the predicted changes in column (2)
correspond to the estimated model in column (2) of Table 5.